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INTRODUCTION
The defendants ("Intermountain Power") insist that the
Industrial Commission correctly dismissed Ms. Bacon's claim with
prejudice, despite ample evidence of her physical limitations and
ineffective counsel.

A careful reading of the Utah cases and

applicable statutory law indicates the injustice of this decision
in light of the circumstances of Ms. Bacon's case.

ARGUMENT

I, DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE IS NOT AN APPROPRIATE ACTION GIVEN
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF MS. BACON'S CASE
A dismissal with prejudice of Ms. Bacon's claim creates a
hardship on an injured worker that goes far beyond the intent of
established Utah law.

While Rule 37(d) of the Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure authorizes the court to take sanctions "as are
just,"(see Addendum) the facts of Ms. Bacon's case fail to rise
to the level of misconduct evident in the Utah cases cited by
Intermountain Power.

Furthermore, worker's compensation

proceedings do not adhere to statutory rules of procedure, and
must construe the law generously in favor of the employee.
First, both Utah cases cited do not concern a plaintiff
seeking redress for physical injuries suffered in the workplace.
In Arnica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989), the party seeking reversal of a default judgement
1

was defending an insurance fraud claim.

This Court stated that

"[i]mposing sanctions for a party's refusal to respond to a court
order compelling discovery is a harsh sanction and therefore,
requires a "showing of willfulness, bad faith, or fault on the
part of the non-complying party." Id. at 961.

The defendant,

after defrauding his insurance company, left a trciil of
"aggravated misconduct in the form of willful and deliberate
disobedience of discovery orders, fabricated testimony, and
attempted witness tampering." Id. at 962.
upheld the sanctions against him.

This Court rightfully

In contrast, Ms. Bacon did not

file her claim in bad faith, nor willfully refuse to answer
interrogatories.

She was suffering from a stress-related

industrial injury and accordingly relied on her original attorney
to pursue her claim properly.

The sanction is particularly

harsh, since Worker's Compensation precludes her pursuing her
employer for compensation for her work injuries.
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court found that a default
judgement was "a stringent measure which should be employed with
caution and restraint only where the failure has been wilful[sic]
and the interests of justice so demand.

Except in very

aggravated cases, less serious sanctions undoubtedly could be
applied to accomplish the desired result."
v. Nunley, 396 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah 1964).

Tucker Realty, Inc.
The non-complying

defendant in Nunley failed to produce documents supporting his
claim of a debt discharge, and gave the court inconsistent
information concerning the alleged documents; the court found
2

this behavior to be willful disregard of the proceedings.
413.

Id. at

Again, Ms. Bacon's failure to provide, via her original

attorney, a complete application and response to interrogatories
should be viewed in light of her disabilities.

Her conduct was

neither willful nor deliberate; her injuries precluded active
participation in her claim, and she relied, to her detriment, on
her attorney.
Furthermore, Rule 37(d) is not even applicable to Industrial
Commission hearings, and thus Intermountain Power put misplaced
reliance on an Arkansas decision based on statutes substantially
different than the pertinent Utah statutes. Loosey v. Osmose Wood
Preserving Co., 744 S.W.2d 402 (Ark. Ct. App. 1988).

According

to Arkansas law at the time the case was decided, the Worker's
Compensation Commission's Rule 16 regulated discovery for claims
before it:

"Depositions may be taken and discovery had by any

party after the claim has been controverted in accordance with
the statutory provisions and rule of civil procedure relating to
civil actions in the Chancery and Circuit Courts of this State. .
."

744 S.W.2d at 403 (emphasis added).

In sum, discovery

followed the Arkansas rules of civil procedure, including Rule
37(d) sanctions.
In contrast, while Utah Rule 37(d) has the same sanction
provisions as its Arkansas counterpart, the Utah statute on
Industrial Commission administrative hearings mandates informal
proceedings without adherence to established rules of procedure:
"Neither the commission nor its hearing examiner shall be bound
3

by the usual common-law or statutory rules of evidence, or by any
technical or formal rules of procedure, other than as herein
provided or as adopted by the commission pursuant to this act.11
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-88 (1988)(emphasis added) (see Addendum).
Thus, the Industrial Commission is not bound by the Utah Rules of
Procedure, particularly Rule 37(d) sanctions.

Granted, Utah

Industrial Commission Rule R490-l-4(h) (see Addendum) states that
failure to comply with such requests may result in the dismissal
of a claim," but offers an alternative sanction of "delay in the
scheduling of a hearing."
In addition, the Industrial Commission's decision to
dismiss with prejudice violated the spirit and intent of the
Worker's Compensation Act to protect employees; the Act must be
construed liberally in favor of the employee.

Jones v.

California Packing Corp.. 244 P.2d 640 (Utah 1952); Salt Lake
City v. Industrial Commission, 140 P.2d 644 (Utah- 1943);

Park

Utah Consolidated Mines Co. v. Industrial Commission, 64 P.2d 3 63
(Utah 1934).
Therefore, given the care and caution exercised by the Utah
courts in using a Rule 37 dismissal with prejudice, and the
informal, employee-oriented approach

of worker's compensation

proceedings, the Industrial Commission erred in dismissing Ms.
Bacon's case with prejudice given the circumstances of her
disabilities.

4

II. MS. BACON USED DUE DILIGENCE TO THE BEST OF HER ABILITY IN
RESPONDING TO THE INTERROGATORIES.
Intermountain Power wrongfully accused Ms. Bacon of failing
to cooperate not only with the Commission, but her original
attorney Mr. Lish.

Ms. Bacon did not receive the interrogatory

forms from Mr. Lish until January 14, 1992 (See Appellant's Brief
p. 5 ) , and mailed the completed forms back to him on January 24,
1992 (see letter in Appellees' Brief, Addendum F ) .

Furthermore,

Ms. Bacon did not, contrary to Intermountain Power's rather
fanciful interpretation, deliberately refuse to cooperate with
Mr. Lish in giving him a full accounting of the facts
precipitating her injury.

A straightforward reading of his

Motion for Review indicates that he made an unsuccessful attempt
to get a statement of facts from Wausau's claims adjuster rather
than cause additional stress upon Ms. Bacon.

Mr. Lish made a

tactical decision, based on Ms. Bacon's disabled state, to go
elsewhere for information for the interrogatories rather than
submit the forms to Ms. Bacon.

At no time was she intentionally

uncooperative, as Intermountain Power insinuates.
Consequently, Ms. Bacon failure to file the interrogatories
was not due to her careless or deliberate disregard of the
requests.

5

CONCLUSION

This Court should reverse the Administrative Law Judge's
dismissal with prejudice, and remand for hearing on Ms. Bacon's
amended application.

Mil
DATED this

[Q

day of November 1992.

ANDERSON AND DREDGE

uli^

By:

U - l&uuL

Sandra N. Dredge
Attorney for the Appellant

6

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of
the foregoing instrument were mailed, first class, postage
prepaid on this \ $*L-^ day of November, 1992, to the following:

Michael E. Dyer
Michael A. Peterson
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson
50 S. Main, Suite 700
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Benjamin A. Simms
Board of Review
Industrial Commission of Utah
160 E. 300 South
P.O. Box 510250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151

hjiicl^

7

_

ADDENDUM

Rule 37(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule R490-l-4(h), Industrial Commission of Utah
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-88

Rule 37

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

their authenticity, to accept a copy of defendant's written admissions served upon plaintiff
as compliance with the rules; where the trial
court chose the latter option, it was proper to
permit plaintiff to recite defendant's admissions into the record. Triple I Supply, Inc. v.
Sunset Rail, Inc., 652 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1982).
—Failure to respond.
Objectionable matter.
Even if a request for an admission is objectionable, if a party fails to object and fails to
respond to the request, then that party should
be held to have admitted the matter. Jensen v.
Pioneer Dodge Ctr., Inc., 702 P.2d 98 (Utah
1985).
Prison inmate.
When inmate served requests for admissions
and interrogatories on prison officials in action
for recovery of value of personal property taken
from him, on failure of officials to respond to
the requests, apply for extension of time, or
move to amend or withdraw their admissions
pursuant to Subdivision (b), all the facts were

deemed admitted and the inmate was entitled
to judgment against the officials. Schmitt v.
Billings, 600 P.2d 516 (Utah 1979).
—Motion to dismiss.
Tolling.
Filing a motion to dismiss did not toll effect
of Subdivision (a), which treats requests for admissions which are not answered within 45
days as if admitted and as a proper basis for
summary judgment. Schmitt v. Billings, 600
P.2d 516 (Utah 1979).
—Punitive damages.
Where plaintiff requests an admission of punitive damages in an amount unrelated to actual damages, the court, as a matter of equity,
must intervene and examine the admission.
Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Ctr., Inc., 702 P.2d 98
(Utah 1985).
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v.
Salt Lake County Comm'n, 14 Utah 2d 151,
379 P.2d 379 (1963); W.W. & W.B. Gardner,
Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734
(Utah 1977).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Depositions
and Discovery §§ 314 to 325.
C.J.S. — 27 C.J.S. Discovery §§ 88 to 110.
A.L.R. — Continuance sought to secure testimony of absent witness in civil case, admissions to prevent, 15 A.L.R.3d 1272.
Party's duty, under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 36(a) and similar state statutes and
rules, to respond to request for admission of

facts not within his personal knowledge, 20
A.L.R.3d 756.
Formal sufficiency of response to request for
admissions under state discovery rules, 8
A.L.R.4th 728.
Permissible scope, respecting nature of inquiry, of demand for admissions under modern
state civil rules of procedure, 42 A.L.R.4th 489.
Key Numbers. — Discovery <s= 121 to 129.

Rule 37. Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanctions.
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon reasonable
notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order
compelling discovery as follows:
(1) A p p r o p r i a t e c o u r t . An application for an order to a partv mav be
made to the court in which the action is pending, or, on matters' relating
to a deposition, to the court in the district where the deposition is being
taken. An application for an order to a deponent who is not a party shall
^ ™ *? t h e T c r o u r t i n t h e d i s t r i c t where the deposition is being taken
U) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or
submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or other entity fails to
make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer
S bmitte d unde
ZZ!tVVf°gat0ry
?
f R u l e 33, or if a party, in response to a
u
request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond t h a t
inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to permit inspection as
requested, the discovering party may move for an order compelling an
answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance
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with the request. When taking a deposition on oral examination, the
proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the examination before he applies for an order.
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part it may make such
protective order as it would have been empowered to make on a motion
made pursuant to Rule 26(c).
(3) Evasive or incomplete answer. For purposes of this subdivision
an evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to answer.
(4) Award of expenses of motion. If the motion is granted, the court
shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose
conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such
conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the
court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or
that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing,
require the moving party or the attorney advising the motion or both of
them to pay to the party or deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney fees,
unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially
justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may
apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion
among the parties and persons in a just manner,
(b) Failure to comply with order.
(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. If a
deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after being directed to
do so by the court in the district in which the deposition is being taken,
the failure may be considered a contempt of that court.
(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party or an
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an
order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an order
entered under Rule 26(f), the court in which the action is pending may
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others
the following:
(A) an order that the matters regarding which the order was made
or any other designated facts shall be taken to oe established for the
purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the action or
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default
against the disobedient party;
(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an
order treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders
except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination;
107
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(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule
35(a) requiring him to produce another for examination, such orders
as are listed in Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, unless
the party failing to comply shows t h a t he is unable to produce such
person for examination.
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court
shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising
him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees,
caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses
unjust.
(c) E x p e n s e s on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit the genuineness
of any document or the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if
the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the
document or the truth of the matter, he may apply to the court for an order
requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in
making t h a t proof, including reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall make
the order unless it finds that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant
to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance, or
(3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe t h a t he might
prevail on the matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to
admit.
(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve a n s w e r s to
interrogatories or respond to request for inspection. If a party or an
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under
Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before
the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper
notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under
Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written
response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper
service of the request, the court in which the action is pending on motion may
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others it may
take any action authorized under Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision
(b)(2) of this rule. In lieu of any order or in addition thereto, the court shall
require the party failing to act or the attorney advising him or both to pay the
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless
the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on the
ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to
act has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c).
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan. If a party
or his attorney fails to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery
plan by agreement as is required by Rule 26(0, the court may, after opportunity for hearing, require such party or his attorney to pay to any other party
the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule corresponds
to Rule 37, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Contempt generally,
§ 78-32-1 et seq.
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granted. Otherwise, compensation may not be allowed
P. "Attending Physician's Statement — Form 043"
— This form must be completed by employee and his
last attending physician in the state to establish the
medical condition of the employee. It must be accompanied by Form 044.
Q. "Compensation Agreement — Form 019" —
This form is used by the parties to a workers' compensation claim to enter into an agreement as to a permanent partial impairment award, and must be submitted to the Commission for approval
R. "Application for Lump Sum or Advance Payment — Form 134" — This form is used by an employee to apply for a lump sum or advance payment
for a permanent partial impairment award.
S. "Release to Return to Work — Form 110" —
This form may be used to meet the requirements of
Rule R490-2-3E, as contained herein.
T. "Insurance Carrier or Self-Insured Employer
Annual Statement of Losses — Form 117" — Parts (a)
and (b) are to be submitted together by J a n u a r y 31st
for the preceding calendar year. P a r t (a), an individual loss claim log, states the losses by individual
claim and part (b) states the aggregate losses by the
insurance carrier or self-insured employer for the preceding calendar year.
Carriers or self-insured employers wishing to submit a computer tape in lieu of the form must obtain
prior written authorization from the Industrial Commission, Industnal Accidents Division.
U. "Disability Status Report — Form 206" — This
report is required, as per Section 35-10-6, U.C A ,
when an injured worker's temporary total compensation exceeds 90 days, or when it appears that the
injured worker will be disabled, whichever comes
first. The insurance carrier or the self-insured employer shall file this report with the Commission
within 30 days thereafter.
V. "Request for Copies From Claimant's File —
Form 205" — This form is used to request copies from
a claimant's file in the Industrial Commission with
the appropriate authorized release.
W "Medical Records — Copies — Form 302" —
This form is used by a claimant to request a free copy
of his/her medical records from a medical provider.
This form must be signed by a staff member of the
Industnal Accidents Division.
X The Director of the Industrial Accidents Division of the Commission may approve change of any of
the above forms upon notice to all concerned parties.
Carriers may print these forms or approved versions.
R490-1-4. Pleadings and Discovery.
A. For the purposes of Section 63-46b-3, U.C.A., all
adjudicative proceedings for workers' compensation
and occupational disease claims shall only be commenced by the injured worker or dependent filing a
request for agency action with the Commission The
Administrative Law Judge is afforded discretion m
allowing intervention of other parties pursuant to
Section 63-46b-9, U.C.A. The Application for Hearing
is the request for agency action All such applications
shall include supporting medical documentation of
the claim where there is a dispute over medical issues Applications without supporting documentation
will not be mailed to the employer or insurance earn e r for answer until the appropnate documents have
been provided.
B Whenever a claim for compensation benefits is
denied by an employer or insurance earner, the burden rests on the applicant to initiate the action by
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filing an Application for Hearing with the Commission.
C When an Application for Hearing is filed with
the Commission, the Commission shall forthwith
mail a copy to the employer or to the employer's insurance carrier
D. The employer or insurance car-ier shall have 30
days following the date of the mailing of Ihe application to file a written answer with the Industrial Commission, admitting or denying liabi lty for the claim
The answer should state ail affirmal ive defenses with
sufficient accuracy and detail that an applicant may
be fully informed of the. nature o" the defense asserted. All answers shall include a summary and categorization of benefits paid to dat€ on the claim. A
copy shall be sent to the applicant or, if there is one,
to the applicant's attorney by the defendant.
E When an employer or insurance e a r n e r fails to
file an answer within the 30 days provided above, the
Commission may enter a default igamst such employer or insurance e a r n e r The Commission may
then set the matter for h e a n n g , tatce evidence bearing on the claim, and enter an Order based on the
evidence presented Such defaults may be set aside by
following the procedure outlined in the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure Said default shall apply to the defendant employer or insurance earner and shall not be
construed to deprive the Employers' Reinsurance
Fund or the Uninsured Employers Fund of any appropriate defenses.
F Where the answer denies liability solely on the
medical aspects of the case, the applicant, through
his/her attorney or agent, and the employer or insurance earner, with the approval of t le Commission or
its representative, may enter into a stipulated set of
facts, which stipulation, together with the medical
documents bearing on the case in the Commission's
file, may be used in making the final determination
of liability
G. When deemed appropriate, the Commission or
its representatives may have a p r e h e a r i n g or posthearing conference.
H Upon filing of the Answer, the defendant may
commence discovery with appropr ate sets of interrogatories Such discovery should focus on the accident event, witnesses, as well as past and present
medical care. The defendant shall ilso be entitled to
appropriately signed medical releases to allow gathering of pertinent medical records The defendant
may also require the applicant to submit to an independent medical examination to he conducted by a
physician of the defendant's choice Failure of an applicant to comply with such requests may result in
the dismissal of a claim or a delay in the scheduling
of a hearing.
I. Commission subpoena forms shall be used in all
discovery proceedings and must be signed, unless
good cause is shown for a shorter period, at least one
week prior to any scheduled hearing
J All medical records shall be filed by the employer or its insurance carrier as a single joint exhibit
at least one week before the scheduled hearing
Claimant must cooperate and s u t m i t all pertinent
medical records contained in his fi e to the employer
or its insurance carrier for the joint exhibit submission two weeks in advance of a s:heduled h e a n n g
Exhibits are to be placed in an indexed binder
arranged by care provider in chronological order Exhibits should include all relevant treatment records
with the exception of hospital nurses notes
K The Administrative Law Judg e must be notified
one week in advance of any proceeding where it is
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Workmen's Compensation Act. Ellis v. Initrial Comm'n, 91 Utah 432, 64 P.2d 363
37).
attorneys' fees in compensation cases should
measured according to the workingman's
tion. Ellis v. Industrial Comm'n, 91 Utah
>, 64 P.2d 363 (1937).

fees in same manner and with same limita
tions as it may review any other decision of the
commission. Ellis v. Industrial Comm'n, 91
Utah 432, 64 P.2d 363 (1937); Thatcher v. Industrial Comm'n, 115 Utah 568, 207 P.2d
(1949).
„
Suspension of attorney from practice.
Attorney's indirect collection of fees from clients in excess of those awarded by Industrial
Commission constituted unprofessional conduct resulting in one year's suspension from
practice. In re Hatch, 108 Utah 446, 160 P.2d
961 (1945).

view by Supreme Court.
ndustrial Commission not only has power to
attorneys' fees in cases before it, but it also
> power to fix fees for services rendered on
iew in Supreme Court, Supreme Court only
zing power to review matter of attorney's

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Jtah Law R e v i e w . — Attorney's Fees in
ah, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 553.
U . S . — 101 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensan § 817.
\.L.R. — Handling, preparing, presenting,

or trying workmen's compensation claims or
cases as practice of law, 2 A.L.R.2d 724.
Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation
<& 1981.

5-1-88. Rules of evidence and procedure before commission and hearing examiner — Admissible evidence.
Neither the commission nor its hearing examiner shall be bound by the
;ual common-law or statutory rules of evidence, or by any technical or foral rules of procedure, other than as herein provided or as adopted by the
mmission pursuant to this act. The commission may make its investigation
such manner as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain the substanal rights of the parties and to carry out justly the spirit of the Workmen's
Dmpensation Act.
The commission may receive as evidence and use as proof of any fact in
spute all evidence deemed material and relevant including, but not limited
the following:
(a) Depositions and sworn testimony presented in open hearings.
(b) Reports of attending or examining physicians, or of pathologists.
(c) Reports of investigators appointed by the commission.
(d) Reports of employers, including copies of time sheets, book accounts
or other records.
(e) Hospital records in the case of an injured or diseased employee.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 88; C.L. 1917,
3148; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-82; L. 1965,
I. 67, § 1.

Meaning of "this act". — See same catchline in notes following § 35-1-46.
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Rules for procedure of
commission, § 35-1-10.
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